**Turkey Updates**

**Turkey UQ**

**Swinland’s NEG. Anakara’s holding up Swinland which is pissing NATO off.**

Galip **Dalay 7-12**-2022. Associate Fellow at Chatham House, Middle East and North Africa Programme. "Turkey gains much from NATO, but a rocky road lies ahead". Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/turkey-gains-much-nato-rocky-road-lies-ahead. Pen-DL

**Despite** the progress, the road to full membership for Sweden and Finland is still likely to be **fraught with bumps** as their accession protocols need to be ratified by all existing NATO members. Turkey would **prefer to delay** this process so that Ankara can use it as leverage to press the Nordic duo to implement their commitments – and even make **new demands** not in the trilateral agreement.

But the **whole saga** over Turkey’s **threat of veto** has probably **cost** Ankara a **loss of goodwill** in Stockholm and Helsinki, two capitals which were supportive of Turkey’s EU membership bid. And the question of implementation is intimately linked to the question of the interpretation of the deal.

Stockholm and Helsinki would probably adopt a minimalist interpretation of the deal whereas Ankara would go for a maximalist version. Erdogan has already claimed Sweden committed to **extradite** 73 people on terrorism charges, but Stockholm has **denied this**, saying any extradition request must go through due legal processes.

Although the threat of Turkey’s vetoing of both countries’ membership bid is now removed, more **haggling and disputes** between Turkey and the two Nordic countries, and hence more delays, is likely remain **on the horizon** until Stockholm and Helsinki finally acquire their full membership in NATO.

**Strat Con’s NEG. It’s bedeviled relations by increasing tension over the Kurds.**

Galip **Dalay 7-12**-2022. Associate Fellow at Chatham House, Middle East and North Africa Programme. "Turkey gains much from NATO, but a rocky road lies ahead". Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/turkey-gains-much-nato-rocky-road-lies-ahead. Pen-DL

With NATO’s new **Strategic Concept** being designed to address a global security environment defined by the great power competition, it was key for Ankara to ensure that the issue of terrorism was not de-emphasized, and so the fact this remained a major part within it was a win for Turkey.

Putting aside major global subjects such as climate, cybersecurity, or competition over space, it is state-centric and conventional security threats that ultimately define the spirit of this document.

Moving forward, Ankara will likely use this document – and its new trilateral memorandum with Sweden and Finland – to press NATO and its members to provide more support in its fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and to refrain from supporting the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its associated Democratic Union Party (PYD).

However, as the PYD/YPG is **only proscribed** as a terrorist organization by Turkey and not **any other** NATO states, this issue will likely continue to **bedevil relations** – especially with the US as the **main partner** of the group.

**Turkey feels like they need NATO now. They want NATO to respond to Russia.**

Galip **Dalay 7-12**-2022. Associate Fellow at Chatham House, Middle East and North Africa Programme. "Turkey gains much from NATO, but a rocky road lies ahead". Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/turkey-gains-much-nato-rocky-road-lies-ahead. Pen-DL

In addition, with the Ukraine invasion, it is understandable that the eastern flank has become a primary focus of NATO action. But Russia has arguably **never had** that much presence in the Mediterranean, being a major player in **Syria**, **Libya**, and the eastern **Mediterranean**, and maintaining **extremely close** relations with **Algeria** and **Egypt** – Moscow has air and naval bases in Syria, Libya, and Algeria. From a **Russian perspective**, the **east** and **south** are **not** seen as two separate spaces but as a single space, and Turkey is a **major actor** in both spaces.

Ankara is one of the primary powers in the Black Sea region but Turkey and Russia **are already** facing each other in **many** Mediterranean conflicts, notably **Syria** and **Libya**. And so, in the face of **continuing** regional instability and disorder, state collapse, and growing Russian and Chinese footprints, Turkey **wants** NATO to **remain committed** to the southern flank and southern neighbourhood. The strong emphasis on the southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and Africa, in the concept note was in line with this preference.

**The US is assuring Greece now.**

Matteo **Cina** **7-18**-2022. "US affirms Greek security in face of Turkish belligerence". Fox News. https://www.foxnews.com/world/u-s-affirms-greek-security-face-turkish-belligerence. Pen-DL

On Monday Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met with his **Greek counterpart** Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos to discuss the recent sale of **F-35 fighter** jets and **joint** U.S.-Greek cooperation in the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean area.

Tensions **have risen** in recent months between the two NATO countries, with Turkey issuing a **series of threats** against Greece.

Victoria Coates, former deputy national security adviser for the Middle East and North Africa, said of the meeting, "Greece is a **critical partner** in the eastern Mediterranean that has been **foundational** in establishing **energy** and **security coordination** in the region. As Turkey takes an **increasingly adversarial** posture, we will need more cooperation **with Greece** not less."

According to the Associated Press Greece and Turkey have **strained relations** over a **slew** of issues including competing **maritime** boundary claims that affect **energy exploration** rights in the eastern Mediterranean. Tensions flared in 2020 over exploratory drilling rights in areas in the Mediterranean Sea where Greece and Cyprus claim their own exclusive economic zone, leading to a naval standoff.

Turkey also claims Greece is violating international agreements by **militarizing islands** in the Aegean Sea. Athens says it **needs to defend** the islands — many of which lie close to Turkey’s coast — against a **potential attack** using Turkey’s large fleet of military landing craft.

In a major **military exercise** last month, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, according to media reports said, "Once again, we call on Greece to stop equipping the islands that are under civilian status and to act in accordance with international agreements. I’m not kidding, **I’m serious**. This nation is **determined**, if it says anything, it **will follow** it."

In May Erdoğan said he would stop talking with the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, after he accused him of persuading Washington not to sell F-16 fighter jets to the Turks during a trip to the U.S.

During Monday's press availability, Secretary Austin said, "The defense relationship between the United States and Greece has **never been** stronger. We especially thank Greece for hosting the U.S. Naval Support Activity at Souda Bay, which is a **cornerstone** of our defense relationship."

His Greek counterpart stated, that Greece "reaffirmed the importance of a strong and **profound** and ever-growing society strategic defense partnership between the United States and Greece" and highlighted the "two updates of the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2019."

Notably, Minister Panagiotopoulos referenced the sale of F-35 fighter jets to the Greek military: "A new milestone of this strategic partnership is without doubt the procurement of the state of the art **F-35 fighter**, a major step for our **deterrence** and even **closer interaction**, coordination and interoperability between the armed force of Greece and the United States."

Selling U.S. fighter jets to Turkey has been a contentious subject in recent years as Erdoğan commits Turkish forces to the fight in Syria at the cost of belligerence to **U.S. allies** and interests. Erdoğan has threatened to block Sweden and Finland’s entry into NATO, waged a limited **intervention** and raids into **Northern Iraq**, and, as such, the U.S. **House** of Representatives recently added **new roadblocks** on Biden’s plan to sell the F-16 fighter jet to Turkey.

Turkey faced **heavy criticism** by the Trump administration and lawmakers when it purchased **Russian S-400** air missile defense system, which led to U.S. sanctions in 2020. At the time, U.S. officials raised alarm bells that the S-400 deal with Russia could endanger NATO security and jeopardize American-Turkey intelligence sharing.

"The Greek defense minister will likely **look for assurances** from the U.S. government that it will not make that F-16 sales to Turkey without stronger guarantees from Turkey — including that air-space violations by Turkish jets will not continue," said Sinan Ciddi, a non-resident senior fellow focusing on Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. "Without this, Greece is likely to attempt to pressure the Biden administration not to support F-16 sales to Turkey."

**F-16 won’t go through but F-35 will.**

Bryant **Harris** 7-19-20**22**. Congress reporter for Defense News. "Greece moves to join Lockheed’s F-35 program as Turkey F-16 bid stalls". Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2022/07/19/greece-moves-to-join-lockheeds-f-35-program-as-turkey-f-16-bid-stalls/. Pen-DL

WASHINGTON – Greek Defense Minister Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos is visiting the United States this week as Athens **continues its bid** to join Lockheed Martin’s F-35 **co-production** program and lobby against a potential F-16 sale to Turkey.

Panagiotopoulos said Tuesday that he discussed Greece’s potential entry into the F-35 program with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin as well as Sean Burke, the director of the Pentagon’s F-35 joint program office. He also noted that he would tour Lockheed’s F-35 production line Fort Worth, Texas on Wednesday alongside the company’s CEO, Jim Taiclet.

“We already have made our interest known,” he told Defense News. “We sent a letter of request, and we have to wait for a time – that’s the procedure – for the letter of acceptance. But everything that needs to be done on a procedural level for a swift entrance into this program is being done.”

Greece sent its official letter of request to buy 20 F-35As last month with an eye on delivery after 2028. Athens has also expressed interest in purchasing an additional batch of F-35s down the line. Joining Lockheed’s co-production program alongside the U.S. and eight other countries would also require Greece to stake its own equities in manufacturing the advanced fighter jets.

Panagiotopoulos said that joining the program reflects the commitment of Greece and the U.S. to **intensify** cooperation “in the domain of **defense procurement**.”

He made the remarks after a meeting with Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., who exercises **considerable leverage** over arms sales to other nations as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Menendez’s home state of New Jersey boasts the sixth largest Greek American population in the U.S. and the fourth largest Armenian American population, making Greece’s adversarial NATO ally Turkey particularly unpopular among many of his constituents.

Greece, Turkey jockey for position in Washington

Menendez **has threatened** to use his leverage to block the $6 billion sale of 40 Lockheed Martin Block 70 F-16 fighter jets to Turkey. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis directly appealed to Congress to block the F-16 sale during an address before a joint meeting of Congress in May – immediately after he announced Greece’s intention to acquire the F-35 at the White House.

The U.S. **kicked Turkey** out of the F-35 co-production program in 2019 over Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense amid fears its advanced radar system could **allow Moscow** to **spy** on the stealth fighter jets.

The Greeks have found a **critical ally** in **Menendez** as they seek to block the F-16 sale to Turkey amid repeated Turkish violations of Greek airspace, the ongoing occupation of Northern Cyprus and maritime disputes over gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean.

This puts Athens at odds with President Joe Biden, who voiced support for the F-16 sale at the NATO summit in Madrid last month after Turkey dropped its opposition to Swedish and Finnish accession to the alliance. The Turks are also seeking a separate $400 million sale to upgrade their current F-16 jets with new missiles, radar and electronics.

“We should sell them the F-16 jets and modernize those jets as well,” Biden said in Madrid. “But I need congressional approval to be able to do that, and I think we can get that.”

It remains **unclear** how the White House plans to **persuade Menendez**, who remains **committed** to using his position to **block the sale**.

Menendez told Defense News on Monday that he remains a **hard no** on the F-16s but said he could consider the sale if Turkey addresses issues he has previously raised with Ankara. Those include its actions in the eastern Mediterranean, its continued possession of the S-400s, it human rights record and ongoing attacks against the US-backed fighters in northeast Syria.

The Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Council has **also lobbied** Congress and the Biden administration **against the sale**, noting that Turkey has used F-16s to target civilian infrastructure in areas under its control as recently as February.

Sinam Mohamad, the Syrian Democratic Council’s envoy to Washington, told Defense News in May that she has engaged lawmakers and the State Department “**at senior levels**” to urge them not to approve the F-16 sale.

The top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, James Risch of Idaho, also has the **authority** to block the F-16 sale and noted that “the situation is fluid right now.”

Risch has **not** yet given the **green light** for the sale to proceed. Still, he told Defense News in May that he was “positively disposed in that direction, but I’m not completely there yet.”

Turkey’s reputation on Capitol Hill **plummeted** following its 2019 S-400 acquisition and attack on the Syrian Kurds that same year, but recently Ankara has managed to claw back some goodwill in Congress over its support for Ukraine.

The chairman and ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Democrat Gregory Meeks of New York and Republican Mike McCaul of Texas, have both indicated that they would not block the sale so long as Turkey continue to work with the U.S. to address outstanding issues.

The House voted 244-179 last week to **add an amendment** from Rep. Frank Pallone, D-N.J., to its annual defense authorization that would require Biden to submit “a **detailed description** of **concrete steps**” to ensure that Turkey does not use the F-16s to violate Greek airspace before proceeding with any sale. The amendment also **requires** that Biden certify that the F-16 sale is in U.S. national **security interests**.

**Congress opposes Turkey now which is key to Mediterranean peace. Specifically, they won’t sell F-16s.**

Chris **Pappas** **7-11**-2022. Lena Argiri interviewing Chris Pappas, Congressman and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs. "The US must not reward Erdogan’s aggression". https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/interviews/1188714/the-us-must-not-reward-erdogans-aggression/. Pen-DL

Turkey’s 2019 purchase and activation of the S-400 surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia **violated** United States law, resulting in its ejection from the F-35 program and the imposition of CAATSA sanctions. More than three years later, the Erdogan government has **made it clear** it has **no intention** of backing away from the S-400 system or addressing the **underlying issues** that led to **its ejection** from the F-35 program and the Congressional holds on purchases of American-made weapons by Turkey. **In fact**, President Erdogan has declared **his intention** to purchase **additional** S-400s multiple times since. One of the reasons Congress insisted on Turkey’s ejection from the F-35 program was because of the significant risks associated with collocating S-400s and F-35s. Experts have noted that providing Turkey F-16 modernization kits poses similar **collocation risks** if Ankara continues to possess Russian S-400s. Since upgraded F-16s still play such a significant role for us and our reliable allies, that is a risk that I do not find acceptable. To make matters worse, Turkey continues to **fly the F-16s** already in its possession over Greek islands and has **violated** Greece’s airspace **thousands** of times in recent months, with **no end** in sight. This isn’t a matter of “just or unjust” – we **cannot reward** the Erdogan government for its aggression or allow it to **escape accountability** for its continued violation of US law and the standards of the NATO Alliance.

What is the timeline moving forward? What is the legislative process until that amendment makes it to the final bill and becomes a US law? It is a long, difficult and uncertain process but I guess that you are optimistic, correct?

In the House, I’ve submitted my amendments for consideration, and we expect to consider the National Defense Authorization Act by the end of July. If the amendment is approved for consideration, I’m confident that it will pass on a **bipartisan basis** as part of the House NDAA. While it’s a long road from submitting my amendment to the NDAA being signed into law, I am optimistic that the amendment will **make it across** the **finish line** because of the **diverse**, bipartisan **coalition** of supporters we’re building in the House.

Should we expect a similar amendment to be introduced in the Senate?

I’m actively in discussions with Senate offices to have a similar amendment introduced for the Senate NDAA and I’m hopeful we’ll be **able to secure** bipartisan, **bicameral** support for this provision.

Are your colleagues in Congress fully aware of Turkey’s aggression in the Aegean and the open **threats of war** against Greece?

I don’t believe enough of my colleagues fully appreciate the threat Turkey’s actions and rhetoric toward Greece pose and the potential for **conflict to erupt**. Turkey repeatedly flies its F-16s over inhabited Greek islands, has launched a **baseless campaign** disputing Greece’s sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, and President Erdogan **openly threatens** armed conflict with Greece on a **regular basis** – as recently as last month. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine **illustrates** the consequences of **inaction** in the face of a **revisionist power** intent on **rewriting history**, violating the **sovereignty** of its neighbor, and **forcibly changing** borders through **intimidation** and **outright** threats of war. Turkey’s **membership** in NATO cannot and should **not** shield the Erdogan government from being **held responsible** for its behavior by US policymakers, and its increasingly **belligerent rhetoric** and behavior toward Greece – a **truly reliable**, democratic NATO ally – **cannot** be ignored.

Are you confident that your colleagues in the House will support the amendments?

I am confident my colleagues will support my amendments. The US-Greece relationship **has exploded** in recent years due in large part to the **bipartisan support** across administrations and in Congress for strengthening our bilateral **cooperation**. This cooperation is founded upon the recognition of Greece as a **reliable, democratic** NATO ally and **pillar** of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. **Meanwhile**, Turkey was warned **several times** of the repercussions of violating CAATSA and given ample opportunities to pursue alternative options and **still proceeded** with the purchase and activation of the S-400 system. Without any meaningful change on Turkey’s part, I don’t see any reason for Congress to back off its opposition to requests from Turkey.

Your amendments also take measures to address Turkey’s destabilizing role inside NATO. How big of a problem has Turkey become as a NATO ally?

It’s **unfortunate** to **see the path** Turkey has taken under Erdogan’s government. **Time** and **time again**, President Erdogan has **gone out** of his way to **weaken** NATO solidarity and security. Turkey weaponized the flow of **Syrian refugees** into Europe as part of a strategy to **blackmail** its allies. Turkey continues to possess the **S-400** missile system despite the **threat** it poses to our F-35s and NATO’s **security architecture**. And Erdogan has **unwisely** chosen to undermine NATO’s unity **amid its response** to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine **by threatening** Greece with war. This raises **serious doubts**, especially in Congress, over whether Erdogan can **ever be** a **reliable** ally.

**AT: Cooperation Turn**

**Turkey-Russian tension inev.**

Galip **Dalay 7-12**-2022. Associate Fellow at Chatham House, Middle East and North Africa Programme. "Turkey gains much from NATO, but a rocky road lies ahead". Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/turkey-gains-much-nato-rocky-road-lies-ahead. Pen-DL

Finally, as expected, Russia is **unambiguously** in the enemy category in the Strategic Concept, which may **put a strain** on Turkey’s complex relationship with Russia as both countries have developed competitive cooperation through different conflict zones – Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh – in recent years. A rupture in these ties would carry significant cost for Ankara, but the type of relationship Ankara-Moscow developed prior to the invasion of **Ukraine** is also **un**likely to **remain tenable**.

**NATO hates Turkey.**

James F. **Jeffrey** 6-15-20**22**. Chair of the Middle East Program, Slater Family Distinguished Fellow, Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey. "The NATO Accession Crisis Risks **Final Collapse** of the Alliance-Turkey Relationship". Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-accession-crisis-risks-final-collapse-alliance-turkey-relationship. Pen-DL

Turkey’s **rejection** of NATO accession for Sweden and Finland, beyond undercutting NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression, reflects a **deeper rift** between the West and Turkey. This is further **manifest** by Ankara’s **recent threat** to expand into **northern Syria** and its **overflights** of **Greek territory**. For the sake of the Alliance, immediate responses are vital, but the rift **will worsen** unless Washington and European capitals work with Ankara to fundamentally shift their relationship. While such a shift has long been advisable given Turkey’s importance, the existential threat of Russian aggression for both Turkey and the Alliance make it urgent.

A month ago, Washington hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu and signaled a new bilateral strategic dialogue. This included possible sales of F-16’s to Ankara, symbolically ending the bitter dispute over a Turkish Russian missile purchase, and Washington’s subsequent cutting Turkey from the F-35 program. Turkey was also following analogous rapprochement with Arab states, Israel, Greece, and Armenia, and now plays a central role in the Ukrainian conflict providing weapons, closing the Straits to Russian naval reinforcements and pressing on various diplomatic exchanges. Then almost **overnight** Ankara lashed out against Finland and Sweden, **threatening to block** their NATO accession if they did not cut real and **alleged ties** to the PKK, and followed up with the aforementioned threats **in Syria** and escalation in the Aegean. Predictably, American commentators **reacted vigorously**, even suggesting once again for Turkey to be **thrown out** of NATO.

Shifting attitudes toward Turkey

Such **dramatic flips** in Turkish policy, **gelding** any predictable diplomacy, have become a **hallmark** of both Turkish president Erdogan and the **convoluted** internal political system with his party, dependent on an **extremist nationalist** partner. Such flips also make efforts to **resolve issues** such as those above (let alone the **underlying rift** between Ankara and NATO allies), a **high-risk** endeavor which most Western leaders avoid, writing Turkey off as **a lost cause**. But as Ukraine has demonstrated, Turkey is vital to containing Russia, as it has been to NATO’s nuclear deterrence, missile defense against Iran, operations in the Balkans, and Afghanistan. It is just too big, too important, and at times too problematic to ignore.

**Turkey loves Iran.**

Hay Eytan Cohen **Yanarocak 7-20**-2022. "Turkey and Iran: ‘Keep your friends close but enemies closer’". JNS.org. https://www.jns.org/opinion/turkey-and-iran-keep-your-friends-close-but-enemies-closer/. Pen-DL

Despite the tense nature of bilateral relations that stem from their centuries-long imperial rivalry and the Islamic revolution—after which Iran sought to export its revolution to Turkey—Turkey and Iran **have never** engaged in a conventional war since the 1639 Treaty of Zuhab.

On June 27, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu **posed for pictures** with his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Ankara as if nothing had happened the previous week, which **testifies** to the **durable nature** of relations between the two countries.

Iran and Turkey do share **common** interests. For instance, both Ankara and Tehran struggle against **Kurdish separatism** within their borders and collaborate against Kurdish independence in northern Iraq. In addition, they have **expressed solidarity** on the Iranian **nuclear program** and the question of international **sanctions**. Since border trade with Iran is **an essential** source of income, Turkey, Brazil and Iran led an initiative to prevent sanctions in May 2010. Then, Turkey attempted to **store Iranian** low-enriched uranium on Turkish soil in return for nuclear fuel. However, this initiative was not embraced by the international community.

In June of that year, **despite** being a **NATO member**, Turkey did **not** hesitate to act against the Western bloc and **vote against** sanctions at the U.N. Security Council. Further, Turkey **circumvented** U.N. sanctions by conducting trade with Iran through its state-owned Halkbank.

**Today**, Turkey’s position remains **essentially unchanged**. During the last Çavuşoğlu-Abdollahian summit in Ankara on June 27, Turkey once again emphasized the need to **abolish all sorts** of sanctions against Iran while calling on the U.S. to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement.

**Err heavily NEG.**

Tony **Antoniou 7-13**-2022. Social science educator. "The Washington Post's awful coverage of autocratic, anti-Western, and belligerent Turkey". Daily Kos. https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/7/12/2109873/-The-Washington-Post-s-awful-coverage-of-autocratic-anti-Western-and-belligerent-Turkey. Pen-DL

There are **shocking omissions** in the supposedly liberal (?) Washington Post's coverage of Turkey. “Liberal” ‌in‌ ‌the question‌ ‌mark‌ ‌because‌ genuine liberals don’t cherry-pick.

Real liberals defend **democracy**, **justice**, and the rule of law **everywhere** and respect different opinions and perspectives. They don't **justify aggressors** and human rights violators, and they don’t **conceal** their transgressions, as The Washington Post does in articles concerning Turkey.

Nor do liberals **remain silent** or **neutral** in the face of injustice or wrongdoing. To quote Desmond Tutu: “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you’ve chosen the side of the oppressors.”

One of The Washington Post's most recent articles by Josh Rogin (June 30) argues that if the United States **sucks up** to Turkey, the latter could help Ukraine “win the war.” **Groveling** to **autocratic** Turkey is **preposterous** and **demeaning** for a superpower, and it will **not** achieve **any** results because Ankara **does not want** Russia to be **defeated** or weekend. A **bleeding Russia** would diminish Turkey's **strategic importance** to the West and undermine Turkish trade and economic **interests**. Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu was **fervently critical** of “some” NATO countries for seeking to prolong the conflict to **weaken Russia**.

It would be **hard to believe** that Turkey, which bought S-400s from Russia, evades **Western sanctions**, calls Moscow a ”**friend**,” and seeks to **remain independent** from the West will help to defeat it.

Cynics may even argue that Mr. Rogin’s article may be a ploy by The Washington Post and the State Department to persuade members of Congress to approve the sale of F-16 air-fighters to Turkey. President Biden backed the deal after Turkey lifted its objections to allowing Sweden and Finland into NATO. But **many lawmakers**, led by Bob Menendez, the **influential** Chair of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, and Carolyn Maloney, Gus Bilirakis, Chris Pappas, and Frank Pallone, Jr. in the House, **oppose it**. They are unwilling to ignore Turkey’s **human rights** violations, hostility towards its **neighbors**, and **blackmail**.

Ankara's **duplicity** in the war in Ukraine and Turkey's **insistence** on continuing to possess its Russian-built S-400 missile system also **troubles many** lawmakers. They prepare for a fight. Congressman Pallone’s letter to President Biden is self-explanatory.

Others may claim that our military industries are also behind Mr. Rogin’s scheme. The Washington Post's independence and self-proclaimed role as a champion of free press, speech, and democracy are at stake here.

**Even** from a **realpolitik perspective**, it makes **little sense**. Suppose we **bow to** and hand over to Erdoğan F16s, as Mr. Rogin suggested. In this case, we will give the Turkish autocrat a **significant victory** that he will take home to help **win the elections** and prolong his grab on power and **despotic** and **anti-Western** rule.

**Overrating** Turkey’s strategic value and **ignoring** its aggression and human rights violations has been a **trademark** of our foreign policy elites **for decades**. A **meticulous** observer of Turkey's foreign policy, **however**, would agree that appeasing and **pampering** the Turks do **not work** and only make them **more arrogant** and **aggressive**.

The Turks will **not** use these air fighters to defend themselves as American laws require or **fight Russia** but to **harass Greece**, a **staunch** U.S. ally, and maintain their **occupation** of northern Cyprus, an EU member state. They will **kill Kurds**, **Armenians**, and **Greeks** as they did in the past and drop **bombs** on **innocent** Yazidi children and women. However, these issues did not concern Mr. Rogin.

**Inclusion shreds human rights. Turkey is curtailing gender equality, discriminating against minorities, and shredding democracy.**

Tony **Antoniou 7-13**-2022. Social science educator. "The Washington Post's awful coverage of autocratic, anti-Western, and belligerent Turkey". Daily Kos. https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/7/12/2109873/-The-Washington-Post-s-awful-coverage-of-autocratic-anti-Western-and-belligerent-Turkey. Pen-DL

The Washington Post's mournful analysis of the declining status of democracy and the rule of law in Hong Kong and other parts of the world while remaining silent or supporting anti-democratic and belligerent Turkey **undermines** its credibility.

The Washington Post and our government **must clean** the **skeletons** from their closets first if they want others to believe they are **serious** about **democracy** and the **rule of law**.

In May, The Washington Post published an article on Turkish women wearing headscarves. There is no point in publishing an article about headscarves when the Turkish regime is **trampling** on women’s rights, and Turks are **murdering** Turkish women in **epidemic** proportions.

Dying to Divorce (2021), a British documentary film directed by Chloe Fairweather portrays the brutal treatment of women in Turkey. President Erdoğan tells his audiences, “You cannot put women and men on an **equal footing**,” and “that’s against nature.”

If The Washington Post was genuinely liberal, independent and a vanguard of democracy and the rule of law as it ‌professes to be, it would have been at the forefront of the fight against arming the Turkish regime.

Erdoğan has been **shredding** Turkey’s **democratic** norms, laws, and institutions. In addition, he **imprisons** and **mistreats** his political opponents and journalists. As a result, Turkey is **among the worst** jailers of journalists **in the world**. Additionally, the Turkish ruler has **significantly curtailed** the rights of women. Recently, Ankara withdrew from the Istanbul Convention, an international treaty combating violence against women. Under the AKP, the number of women murdered by men rose rapidly. Turkish femicide rates are among the worst. The regime has also been notoriously **brutal** toward LGBTQ+ communities.

**Even worse** is the way the Turks treat their **ethnic** and **religious** minorities. There have been **killings**, **abuse**, and **discrimination** against Kurds, Alevis, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews.

**Turkey IL**

**Erdogan grabs what he can. The election makes it especially likely.**

Nathalie **Tocci 7-8**-2022. Italian political scientist and international relations expert, Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, and has an advisor to Italy and to EU officials, PhD in International Relations. "When it comes to Erdoğan, there’s no easy solution". POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-recep-tayyip-erdogan-nato-russia-ukraine-no-easy-solution/. Pen-DL

But now, the war in Ukraine has once again enhanced Turkish power, and an **opportunistic** Erdoğan seems keen to **grab** what he can.

In the early phases of the war, Turkey **positioned itself** as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, and then it capitalized on the NATO membership applications of Sweden and Finland to **extract benefits**. Now, it can seek advantages from Russia’s Black Sea blockade too: Given its role in the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey is the go-to-place for any agreement — whether negotiated with Russia through the U.N. or unilaterally pursued by a coalition of the willing — to get grain out of Ukraine. It also plays a key role in the East Med gas conundrum, the strategic relevance of which hasincreased as Europe weans itself off Russian gas.

So, with elections **scheduled** for June 2023 and an economy in trouble, Erdoğan is once again **banking** on nationalism — stoked by such foreign policy maneuvers and **confrontations** — to come to his rescue. With inflation soaring at near 79 percent, the lira continuously sliding, and Erdoğan unwilling to halt his refusal to increase interest rates, Turkey’s economy is in tatters — and its prospects are unlikely to improve in the coming year.

**No war now because NATO has Greece’s back. But it’s not impossible due to domestic pressures.**

Oliver **Hartwich 6-29**-2022. Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative. "Why Europe’s next war could be between Greece and Turkey". Newsroom. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/why-europes-next-war-could-be-between-greece-and-turkey. Pen-DL

To make matters worse, yet **another war** is on **the horizon**. It would even be a conflict between two Nato members. I am referring to Greece and Turkey, of course. (Or Türkiye, as the country now wants to be called.)

If there is a traditional arch enmity in international affairs, it is the one between Athens and Ankara. Their conflict **dates back** more than **half a millennium**, which makes it older than the two modern states of Greece and Turkey.

The potted history is this: In the 15th century, the Ottoman and Byzantine empires struggled for dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean. After the Ottomans captured Constantinople in 1453, the Greeks were forced into centuries of minority status in the Ottoman Empire.

Even after Greece became independent and recognised by the Ottoman Empire in 1830, the animosity continued. A hundred years ago, the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 ended with a Greek defeat as well as ethnic cleansing and resettlement on both sides.

After this tumultuous history, it was a small miracle that both countries formed friendly relations that led them to join Nato in 1952.

However, since the mid-1950s the old animosities returned. First, over who controls Cyprus, and then increasingly over access to natural resources in the region. All this always played out against the backdrop of a long-running cultural rivalry.

The Greek-Turkish conflict is so old it is almost part of European folklore. Yet the escalation of rhetoric over the past weeks is extreme, even by its normal standards. The timing was also surprising.

When Putin started his aggression against Ukraine, there was a brief moment when it looked like both Athens and Ankara had buried the hatchet. Instead of their usual bickering they may for once stand together and confront the Russian invasion as Nato members.

But then the Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, gave a speech to both chambers of the US Congress on May 17. It was an address dominated by foreign policy issues, not least the importance of US military bases in Greece for supplying Ukraine with weapons.

Mitsotakis, however, did not stop there. Instead, he made Greece’s case for acquiring the F-35 stealth fighter jet from the US – and against allowing Turkey to upgrade their F-16 jets with new missiles, radar and electronics.

In his address, Mitsotakis said: “The last thing that Nato needs at a time when our focus is on helping Ukraine defeat Russia’s aggression is another source of instability on Nato’s South-Eastern flank. And I ask you take this into account when you make defence procurement decisions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean.”

It did not take long for Ankara to reply. Its president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, tweeted: “We warn Greece once more to avoid dreams, statements and actions that will lead to regret, as it did a century ago, and to return to its senses.”

The threat of war may not be obvious unless one is familiar with the history of the conflict. “A century ago” refers to the last Greco-Turkish war. The “lead to regret” line was a hint that Greece lost.

In other words, rather than coming closer together in the face of the Ukraine war, Greece and Turkey are drifting further apart.

This is a nightmare scenario for Nato. It is the opposite of what it would have hoped for. Turkey and Greece being on the same page would have contributed to the alliance’s collective security in the Mediterranean.

In the years before the Ukraine war, Russia and China became more active in the Eastern Mediterranean with economic initiatives. Counteracting this would have required a new Turkey and Greece to find a way to live together – a possibility that now looks less likely.

How will Nato members position themselves in this conflict? **At the moment**, the majority of Nato members support Greece. Or perhaps more accurately, they are **against Turkey**.

Erdoğan has **irritated** Western Europe for many years. The role he played in the various refugee crises is questionable. His domestic economic policy is a disaster. His relationship with Russia has long **been ambiguous**.

It is no wonder more Nato members are siding with Greece in this conflict. The US has traditionally been on Greece’s side anyway. Regardless of how other Nato members are positioned, the most important question is how the Turkish president will handle this crisis.

It is a challenging situation for Erdoğan. Next year, he will face presidential elections. The economy of his country is in turmoil, with an inflation rate of more than 70 percent. Because of Erdoğan’s idiosyncratic understanding of economics and his constant interference in the Turkish central bank, Turkish price increases are directly linked to him.

In these circumstances, it may be tempting for the president to **start a war** against Greece to win back **popular respect**. A war would provide a **distraction** from domestic politics and inflation.

**Peace now, but anything could set off war.**

Burcu **Ozcelik** **7-19**-2022. Associate Fellow focusing on Middle East and Turkey at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, PhD in Politics and International Relations. "Are Greece and Turkey Locked in a Mediterranean Forever War?". National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/are-greece-and-turkey-locked-mediterranean-forever-war-203657. Pen-DL

What would it take to **set off** a military confrontation between the two sides? **Not much**, despite NATO’s deconfliction **mechanism** between the two alliance members. According to George Tzogopoulos, a scholar on regional energy geopolitics, Greek-Turkish relations have entered a **dangerous spiral** in the **last two** years. While not immediately likely, it is possible that a military accident could occur **at any time** in the eastern Mediterranean, with the potential escalation largely dependent on the capacity of the United States to protect NATO’s South-Eastern flank.

**PIC---Space**

**Attention seekers! Turkey’s program is useless, not beneficial to NATO’s collective security, and Turkey’s in Russia’s SOI.**

**Aerospace** 2-4-20**22**. Aerospace Technology quoting Madeline Wild, Associate Analyst in Aerospace, Defence and Security. covers the latest stories in aerospace technology. "Regional rivalries and Nato tensions – defining Turkey’s military space ambitions". Aerospace Technology. https://www.aerospace-technology.com/comment/regional-rivalries-nato-tensions-turkey/. Pen-DL

Over the past decade, Turkey has **launched** its defense industry into the space domain, in an attempt to match the fast-developing capabilities of its regional and global counterparts. The oft used term ‘space race’ does not represent global industrial activities in the domain, but it does hint at the growing pressure for countries who previously were not involved in extra-terrestrial activities to catch up and participate. Turkey’s goals include a plan for a hard landing of a domestically produced rocket on the moon by 2023, with a soft landing and rover launch by 2028, the construction of a Turkish space port, and plans to send a Turkish citizen to the ISS.

Madeline Wild, Associate Defense Analyst, comments: “Turkey’s ambitious aim to have launched a rocket that can reach the moon by 2023 reflects the **overall nature** of its space program. **Rather** than purely being necessitated by **the desire** for sovereign use and control of **satellites**, it revolves around the **power** and **political superiority** that **headline grabbing** achievements (such as reaching the moon) can bring. The introduction of Turkey’s space program in 2021 came **shortly after** Turkey’s longtime rival the UAE, announced that its space probe had entered Mars’ orbit. President Erdogan’s speech in February 2021, launched the Turkish space program and reinforced the geopolitical importance of the space program, much of which was rhetorically charged with ideas of domain leadership and the ‘space race’.

“Last year NATO made space the fifth domain to be covered by the collective security principles set out in the organizations charter. Subsequently it is unsurprising that members such as Turkey are boosting their space programs, in order to fulfil their commitments in the event of any potential incident in this domain. This will have been noted by TUA, the Turkish Space Agency, but it will not be the desire to uphold NATO’s **collective security** principle driving Turkish space development. **Instead**, Turkey’s **fractious relationship** with certain NATO members will fuel the desire to become a **regional leader** in the domain.”

Wild continues: “In the Strategic Plan 2019-2023, Turkey set out its aims to produce and procure 75% of all goods domestically by 2023. In order to do so whilst still meeting its space related targets, Turkey’s aerospace industry will have to rapidly upskill. Whilst Turkey will benefit from the fact that its domestic industry (namely state-owned company Rokestan) has already launched a sounding rocket, much of the current space activities are reliant on international cooperation. For example, US-based SpaceX is currently responsible for the launch of Turkish satellites, Türksat 5A being the most recent of these. Elon Musk and President Erdogan have had direct communication to discuss future cooperation and collaboration.”

“Turkey is also **collaborating** with Russia on space-based technology, a move which could heighten already tense relationships between NATO and the Black Sea state. Russia will help Turkey construct **two launch platforms**, one on land and one on sea. This forms part of a **wider package** of defense cooperation between the states, after the US denied the sale of the F-35 to Turkey, **pushing** President Erdogan further into the President Putin’s **sphere of influence**.”